We investigate opinion formation against authority in an authoritarian society composed of agents with different levels of authority. We explore a (symbolically) "right" opinion, held by lower-ranking, obedient, less authoritative people, spreading in an environment of a "wrong" opinion held by authoritative leaders. The mental picture would be that of a corrupt society where the ruled people revolts against authority, but it could be argued to hold in more general situations. In our model, agents can change their opinion depending on the relative authority to their neighbors and their own confidence level. In addition, with a certain probability, agents can override the authority to take the right opinion of a neighbor. Based on analytic derivation and numerical simulations, we observe that both the network structure and heterogeneity in authority, and their correlation significantly affect the possibility of the right opinion to spread in the population. In particular, the right opinion is suppressed when the authority distribution is very heterogeneous and there is a positive correlation between the authority and number of neighbors of people. Except for such extreme cases, the spreading of the right opinion from the obedient agents takes place when there exist a tendency to override the authority to take the right opinion, but it can take a long time depending on the model parameters. We argue that the underlying social structure of agents sets the time scale of reaching consensus, based on the analysis of the underlying social relations.
I. INTRODUCTION
How much an opinion against a firmly established authority can spread in a population is an important estimate of the population's adaptability [1] , in particular, when there exists a strong heterogeneity in the distribution of influential power regarding opinion formation. In a wide view on opinion formation processes, it has been studied to reveal the hidden mechanisms of a collective opinion formation on social networks [2] [3] [4] [5] . There have been various opinion formation models, including the voter model [6, 7] , majority rule model [8] , bounded confidence model [9] , and Sznajd model [10] . Many opinion formation models have focused on the effect of the heterogeneity in network structure for the ability to reach a global consensus [11] , and considered heterogeneous distributions of personal characteristics-gender, age, job, economic level, personal interests and so on [12, 13] , as those two characteristics are important for opinion dynamics on networks [14, 15] . However, most opinion formation models mix the concept of heterogeneity in the individual level with structural heterogeneity even though structural and individual heterogeneity can be independent to each other [16, 17] . Previous studies derive the personal heterogeneity in influential power from the structural heterogeneity such as the number of neighbors (degree) [11] or PageRank [18, 19] . There have been other attempts to highlight heterogeneity in individual attributes [20] [21] [22] [23] , along with the authority dispersion [24] and asymmetric opinions [25] . However, it is still different from overall authority dispersion. Thus, we are still in the lack of understanding the transmission of opinions held by non-influential agents, grounded on the heterogeneity in both network-structural properties and influential power or author-To answer these questions, we introduce a stylized opinion formation model in a population with fixed authority scores assigned to its agents, who are connected via networks [26] . We assume heterogeneously distributed authority scores assigned to the agents, each of whom additionally has two characteristics: the willingness to follow the right opinion and a confidence level. The acceptance probability of right opinion is characterized by the parameter hinted by the experiment of Milgram [27] , explaining the probability against an authoritative person's immoral opinion. An authority comparison, which agents apply on the decision process [28] , occurs as well. As an illustrative case, we assume a corrupt population where authoritative agents have a "wrong" opinion on a certain issue, to investigate the opinion spreading process smeared from the obedient agents' "right" opinion. Of course, the notion of wrong and right opinions is purely for the sake of argument and used as the binary alternatives in our mechanistic model. It is possible to understand the result as a trend of the opinion transmission from the obedient agents with a certain level of adherence in their opinion. We show the crucial role of the correlation between network structure and authority, via intrinsic social relations generated from the authority comparison process. Moreover, we suggest the possibility of the existence of a specific group which is important for preserving the obedient agents' opinion and eventually emanating it to the entire population in the most corrupt case characterized with the completely bipolar initial opinions. . For instance, node 1 chooses node 9 for comparison (the blue edge-the same process occurs at node 3 choosing node 7 for comparison), and takes node 9's opinion (σ 1 = 1 → 0 and σ 3 = 1 → 0) at t = 1, naturally because node 9 has higher authority than node 1. At t = 2, node 8 chooses node 4, then with the acceptance probability of right opinion p, regardless of their authority scores, node 8 takes the right (σ 4 = 1) opinion of node 4 (σ 8 = 0 → 1).
II. MODEL
We construct a network composed of N agents as the nodes (thus we use the terms "agent" and "node" interchangeably in this paper), and the edges represent the relationship through which the authority comparison and the opinion spreading occur. For network generation, we mainly use the unweighted and undirected scale-free network (SFN) without self-loop and multiple edges, from the configuration model [29] , along with the fully connected network model to simulate the wellmixed population. In case of the configuration model, we generate the degree distribution following the power-law form p(k) ∼ k −λ which yields a degree sequence {k i } for nodes or agents i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}. We control the heterogeneity of degree by adjusting the λ value, where the smaller λ results in more heterogeneous degree distributions. There is no effect of structural heterogeneity in the fully connected network obviously and it is expected to follow the mean-field approach in Sec. III. We assume each agent as a subordinate follower who is willing to follow opinions of agents with relatively high authority. The comparison occurs in the network structure that displays the interactions via the network edges. Each agent has two global intrinsic parameters representing individual characteristics: the confidence parameter α, and the acceptance probability of right opinion p controlling the probability to follow the neighbor with the correct opinion.
To express the heterogeneous authority, we generate random numbers extracted from a power-law distribution with the minimum value of unity, inspired by the distribution of wealth and income, which are representatives of authority. It is known to follow the Pareto distribution [30] , the special 
case of power-law distribution. The set of authority scores is denoted as {s i } for agents i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} and is going to be correlated with the agents' degree in different levels. We assign the authority scores for each agent extracted also from the power-law distribution form p(s) ∼ s −γ , where the smaller γ results in more heterogeneous authority distributions. We focus on the two cases γ = 2 and 3, as γ = 2 is an important threshold for the consensus behavior that will be presented in Sec. III. Therefore, we have two sets of powerlaw distributed values: degrees {k i } characterized by the exponent λ and authority scores {s i } characterized by the exponent γ. We assume that the authority score and the degree can be correlated or independent to each other. As representative cases, we take three types of correlations: positive, no (uncorrelated), and negative correlations. For instance, the positive correlation implies that agents with higher authority have larger amount of network resource. To adjust the correlation in practice, we sort both {s i } and {k i } from the smallest to the largest and match the indices of the sorted {s i } with the sorted {k i } in their exact order (i.e., the rank-based correlations = 1). The negative correlation is achieved by the opposite way of ordering, i.e., matching the indices using the ascending order for {s i } and the descending order for {k i }. The uncorrelated case corresponds to the random matching.
For the sake of simplicity in our model, we assume the degree and authority scores ({k i } and {s i }) are not changed over time, i.e., we assume that the time scale of opinion spreading is much faster than that of the structural change of the population. As a dynamic opinion variable, each agent i has the timedependent binary opinion σ i (t) ∈ {0, 1} at each time t, where we consider 1 as the "right" and 0 as the "wrong" opinion as our convention. In our study, we assign the right (wrong) opinion to the bottom (top) half of agents in terms of authority, respectively, to simulate the most corrupt population. At each time step, we randomly select a node denoted as i and one of its neighbors j chosen randomly. The first process conducted on the two selected nodes i and j is, with the probability p, to check the condition of the acceptance of the right opinion. In particular, agent i checks if j has the right opinion [σ j (t) = 1]. If σ j (t) = 1, i follows j's opinion [σ i (t + 1) = 1], regardless of i's present opinion [σ i (t)] and their authority scores. As a complementary process, with the probability 1 − p, agent i compares his/her own authority with agent j's and decides whether he/she follows agent j's opinion or not. The criterion is calculated by their authority and the confidence level α. It is described with q as following:
Otherwise, agent i feels obliged to follow agent j's opinion
Thus, large values of α represent stronger tendency to keep one's own opinion, as he/she has the confidence on it. In particular, when p = α = 0, our model is equivalent to the conventional voter model. Table I summarizes the rule. We believe that the rule captures an essential psychological property revealed by the experiment of Milgram [27] -the existence of a neighbor taking the right decision is enough to drastically increase agents' adherence towards right opinion against the immoral authority, even if a person alone is hard to find such a strong motivation to go against the authority.
III. ANALYTIC DERIVATION ON THE STABILITY CONDITION
In this section, we derive the stability condition for the steady state of opinions. At time t, agent i [with the authority score s i and opinion σ i (t)] interacts with its random neighbor j [with s j and σ j (t)]. Then, the agent i's opinion at time t + 1 is determined as Table I . Assume that all of the agents are statistically equivalent and the neighbors are chosen uniformly at random (well-mixed population). If we denote the fraction of agents with the opinion 1 at time t as m(t), the probability of σ i (t) = 1 and that of σ j (t) = 1 are also m(t) = σ i (t) , where the angular bracket denotes the agent-and-ensemble-averaged quantity. According to Table I , with the shorthand notation q ≡ q(s i , s j ; α) in Eq. (1), the probability of σ i (t + 1) = 1, or equivalently the average opinion of i is (2) where we assume the independence of the current opinion and (static) authority and Pr[q ≥ 0] denotes the probability that the inequality q ≥ 0 holds. Rearranging all of the terms and imposing the steady state condition
where replacing the instantaneous opinions σ i (t) and σ i (t + 1) with the averaged opinions σ i (t) = m(t) and σ i (t + 1) = m(t + 1) corresponds to our mean-field assumption. Therefore, for p > 0 and Pr[q ≥ 0] > 0, m = 0 or 1 (in practice, due to the intrinsic asymmetry between 0 and 1 for p > 0, the simulation results almost always converge to m = 1, as presented in Sec. IV), and the steady-state with 0 < m < 1 is only possible for Pr[q ≥ 0] = 0 or p = 0. Let us consider the explicit form of Pr[q ≥ 0]. We give the power-law form of the authority distribution p(s) = (γ − 1)s −γ as we mentioned in previous section, if we take s min = 1 [for the proper normalization
where Θ(q) is the Heaviside step function (= 1 when q ≥ 0 and = 0 when q < 0).
always, as s i ≥ 1. Therefore, the integral in Eq. (4) becomes
so we have to split the integration range for s j in Eq. (4):
Combining the two cases, we obtain
When α = 1/2, Eq. (9) (9) into Eq. (3), as we usually consider γ > 1, the steady-state with 0 < m < 1 is possible for α = 0 or p = 0, which explains the L-shaped non-transmission region in the simulation results presented in Sec. IV.
In case of the SFN with the perfectly positive correlation between the degree and authority, i.e., the case that the authority and degree coincide, p(s j ) = (γ − 1)s −γ j should be replaced with p(s j ) = (γ − 2)s 1−γ j because the probability of being a neighbor will be proportional to the neighbor's authority (= degree) and the exponent for the power-law distribution is modified by 1 (the celebrated "friendship paradox") [16, 17] .
In that case, the probability becomes
One can also check the continuation in Eq. (10) at α = 1/2. Fig. 2(b) ], implying that the 0 < m < 1 stable state is possible for any α(< 1) and p values. This illustrates the situation that spreading of the right opinion can be severely suppressed by the dominating hubs (with large degree and authority at the same time).
For the negative correlation, let us consider the case s i ∝ 1/k i where k i is the degree of node i. Then, p(s j ) = γs −1−γ j (the probability of being chosen as one's neighbor is inversely proportional to the neighbor's authority), which gives
In this case, Pr[q ≥ 0] > 1/2 for α = 1/2, implying that "your neighbor is weaker than you" (the "inverse" friendship paradox) [16, 17] . on the horizontal axes. The assumption s i ∝ 1/k i is technically different from our negative correlation case in Sec. II, where we just use the inverse order between {s i } and {k i }, but we believe that the stability condition will be the same, based on the robustness of the condition from the uncorrelated to inversely correlated cases described in this section.
IV. RESULTS
We present our numerical simulation results in this section. The average opinion of the agents at each discrete time step t for a single realization (both the network structureonly meaningful for SFN cases, of course-and authority scores are determined at the initial stage for each realization) ν ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1} is given by
where σ ν;i (t) is the opinion of agent i for the particular realization ν (we use this additional subscript for the rest of this section for clarity). Note that m ν (t) in Eq. (12) is the same as the fraction of agents with the right opinion [σ ν;i (t) = 1], as σ ν;i (t) ∈ {0, 1}. If the opinions in the network do not change for the t c consecutive time steps, we consider that the population reaches a steady state and record the time to reach the steady state τ s (this is distinguished from the consensus time τ when there is no active edges connecting the agents with different opinions for the first time, i.e., the system reaches an absorbing state). To estimate τ s for the p = 0 cases, however, we have to loosen the convergence condition for computational tractability as there always exist finite temporal fluctuations in that case. We assume the system reaches the steady state when t satisfies |m ν (t − u + 1) − m ν (t − u)| < 0.05 ∀u ∈ {0, 1, · · · , t c − 2, t c − 1} for the first time. The average opinion m ν (t) over the agents is again averaged over n realizations for given α and p parameters. In other words,
Eventually, the average opinion for both agents and realizations (as in the probabilistic argument in Sec. III) is
The realizations that reach consensus are divided into the right (wrong) consensus if m ν (τ) = 1 [m ν (τ) = 0], respectively, and the fraction of the former is denoted as f R . We numerically investigate the effect of the degree distribution p(k) and heterogeneous authority with the individual characteristics (the confidence level α and the acceptance probability of right opinion p) for the transmission of the right opinion of agents with low authority in SFN. We first study the effect of the heterogeneity represented by γ in the whole personal characteristic parameter space (p ∈ [0, 1], α ∈ [0, 1]). As described in Sec. II, we compare γ = 2 and 3 cases for the different heterogeneity, with the no, positive, and negative correlations between {k i } and {s i }. For our simulation, we set N = 1000, n = 2000, and t c = 50 (in the unit of Monte Carlo steps), unless otherwise stated, for each (p, α) parameter combination.
A. Macroscopic dynamics of opinion spreading Figure 3 shows the result of the fully connected network case where only the authority heterogeneity matters, where the L-shaped boundary is consistent with our mean-field calculation in Sec. III, as expected. Again, as remarked in Sec. III, even if both m = 0 and m = 1 absorbing states are possible, due to the intrinsic asymmetry favoring m = 1 for p > 0, one can see that it is extremely likely that the system converges to the m = 1 absorbing state, not the other one. The results of γ = 2 and γ = 3 (remember that the γ exponent controls the heterogeneity of the authority, not the network structure) describe the boundary on the axis even though the non-transmission of the right opinion (= 1) area in γ = 3 is larger than the γ = 2 case. This finite-size effect is also anticipated from the discussion in Sec. III; a more severe finite-size effect characterized by the wider boundary straps on the horizontal axis for γ = 3 is expected from the functional form of Pr[q ≥ 0] plotted in Fig. 2(a) , where the larger γ values induce more rapid decreasing Pr[q ≥ 0] as α → 0.
For the SFN cases, we set the degree distribution exponent λ [in p(k) ∼ k −λ ] equal to the authority heterogeneity exponent γ [in p(s) ∼ s −γ ], to compare with the analytic result in Sec. III. In other words, the γ value controls the heterogeneity in both authority and degree distribution following the same power-law form. We generate {s i } for the authority and the degree sequence {k i } drawn from the same power-law form p(s) ∼ s −γ and p(k) ∼ k −γ , respectively, with the minimum values of s min = 1 for authority and k min = 2 for the degree sequence to ensure the connectivity. As described in Sec. II, we sort both the authority scores and the degree sequence. Then, we match them in the exact order for the positive correlation.
For the uncorrelated case, we randomly match {s i } and {k i }, and we match them in the inverse order for the negative correlation case. The SFN results from the uncorrelated and negatively correlated cases shown in Figs. 4(a), (b) , (d), and (e) match well with our analytic derivation in Sec. III. The Lshaped phase boundary is clearly shown, as our derivation predicts. Two distinguishable patterns arise in the positive correlation case-see Figs. 4(c) and (f). First, the successful transmission (i.e., the right opinion prevails) area increases with the increase of γ only in the positive correlation case [Figs. 4(c) and (f)] because of the stability of 0 < m < 1 for γ = 2 as we have shown analytically in Sec. III. Larger γ values imply more homogeneous degree distributions or the reduction of the hub effect. However, when α is very small (α 0.1), more homogeneous structures make the system more difficult to reach the right consensus. It implies that some extent of heterogeneity in the degree distribution can augment the successful transmission, which represents the importance of the degree heterogeneity regarding the less stubborn individuals.
Second, there are boundary curves different from the L-shape, which makes the nontrivial amount of nontransmission area of the right opinion (0 < m < 1). Two personal characteristics play different roles in distinguishable network structures in terms of the authority and degree distribution, i.e., p plays a crucial role for severe heterogeneity, while α does for more homogeneous structure in the positive correlation case. In contrast, the transmission region is considerably larger for small p at γ = 3. We can deduce the crucial role of the confidence level α of individuals in the positive correlation condition, and the case γ = 2 [ Fig. 4(c) ] coincides with our derivation in Sec. III where the nontrivial stable solution 0 < m < 1 is possible. From this result, we conclude that the confidence level α plays a salient role with increased homogeneity, and a small change in the acceptance probability of right opinion p yields dramatic differences in severely heterogeneous structures. Since p represents the willingness for authoritarians to accept the right opinion of agents with less authority and α represents the tendency of adherence for agents with less authority to accept the opinion of agents with higher authority, the results show the importance of the role of authority in a strict hierarchical structure and the stubbornness of individuals in more homogeneous structures. Additionally, we present an evidence for the fact that the presented model is equivalent to the voter model when p = 0 and α = 0. The average opinion m for p = 0 and α = 0 is close to zero in the positive correlation case considering the same argument as in the friendship paradox [16, 17] (the 0 opinion is more likely to be picked as a neighbor). In contrast, m 1/2 for p = 0 and α = 0 in the uncorrelated case, and m 1 for p = 0 and α = 0 in the negative correlation case.
We present the analysis on the consensus time τ for the positive correlation, as the positive correlation case is prevalent in our society [16, 17] . The consensus time for opinion dynamics is an important parameter to investigate the temporal scale of the consensus process in details and its divergence signifies the dynamic phase transition [31] . We average the consensus time over n = 500 independent simulations in this case. The consensus time τ shown in Fig. 5 describes an opportunity cost for the transmission of the right opinion: a larger transmission probability requires longer consensus time. Apparently, there is a confidence level α max with which the simulation takes the longest consensus time τ, depending on the p values and system heterogeneity. As shown in Figs. 5(a) and (c), τ has the clear maximum point for small p < 0.5. The maximum point is located at α max = 0.6 for γ = 2, slightly larger than α max = 0.5 at γ = 3. another side of the consensus. The fraction of right consensus f R at consensus time τ, defined in Sec. II for α > α max ), is close to unity in larger α than maximum α (α max , for γ = 2, α max = 0.6, for γ = 3, α max = 0.5). Each structure shares this same tendency even though γ = 2 requires larger α values and varies more in f R for small p < 0.5. In short, the transmission of the opinion of agents with low authority takes more time (large τ) and requires higher confidence level (large α), for the case of scant sense of the acceptace of right opinion (small p) and large heterogeneity (small γ).
B. Microscopic dynamics of opinion spreading
So far, we have presented how much an opinion of obedient agents with less influential power can be spread to the whole population. In particular, the role of control parameters, α and p, is changed with different levels of structural heterogeneity in networks and the correlation between degrees and authority. In this subsection, we investigate more about the detailed opinion transmission dynamics in terms of the maximum consensus time (related to the quality of consensus) and subgroups of agents (the distinguishable behaviors of individuals) to understand the effect of different heterogeneity in the authority level to the collective contribution to the spreading process. We claim that the large τ values are in fact caused by the social ties representing the comparison processes in Eq. (1), illustrated in Fig. 6 . Although the substrate network constructed at the initial stage of the model is undirected, the relations between agents have an intrinsic directionality. Consider nodes 2 and 5 in Fig. 6(a) . The authority scores are s 2 = 1.28 and s 5 = 1.83, respectively. As q(s 2 , s 5 ; α = 0.3) < 0 and q(s 5 , s 2 ; α = 0.3) < 0 from Eq. (1), the opinion can spread in both directions (node 2 → node 5 and node 5 → node 2) for α = 0.3, represented as a bidirectional edge between the two nodes in Fig. 6(b) . In contrast, q(s 2 , s 5 ; α = 0.6) > 0 and q(s 5 , s 2 ; α = 0.6) > 0, so no opinion transmission can occur between the two nodes in any direction for α = 0.6, represented as the absence of an edge between the two nodes in Fig. 6(c) .
The structural change in dynamics is characterized by the size of connected components. As one can see from the connected components in Figs. 6(b) versus (c), an important transition analogous to the percolation transition occurs somewhere in between. In that example, node 2 becomes isolated from the giant component (GC) for the transmission network (for simplicity, we neglect the directionality for the connected component analysis), so there is no way to change its opinion through the comparison process, which is main dynamics, and it is possible only for choosing the right opinion regardless of the authority comparison with the parameter p. Therefore, we suggest that such a qualitative change in the social structure explains the consensus time depending on α. Depending on α, significantly different social structures emerge. In practice, we take the fraction of GC, S GC = N GC /N (where N GC is the number of agents belonging to the giant component) as the level of separation in social structure-see Figs. 5(a) and (c). We find that α max is located near the transition point of the GC size.
As we have shown, the connected component analysis from the relative authority highlights its importance in opinion spreading in the model. In this subsection, we observe the evolution of opinion for each authority group. To elaborate on different authority groups, we observe the average opinion m i (t) for each authority index i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} (sorted as larger numbers represent higher authority, for natural notational convenience in this section) as a function of time. Interestingly, there are certain authority groups that "protect" the right opinion for a long time-see Figs. 7(a) and (b). We present the result with p = 0.1 to emboss the effect of different authority level. The clear behavior of the special group emerges from α = 0.8 for γ = 2, α = 0.6 for γ = 3, based on the result shown in Fig. 5 consistently. The specific groups keeping the right opinion for the right consensus cases are shown in Figs. 7(a) and (b) . To be more specific, the agents around i = 20 and 40 for γ = 2 and those around i = 30 for γ = 3 play such a role of "reservoir" for the opinion transmission. Those groups start to recover the right opinion faster, and it seems that they are primers for the transmission of the right opinion to outside.
To identify the role of those groups further, we illustrate the snapshots of opinion formation for the γ = 3 case in Fig. 8 . (a) displays the initial condition of the followship structure described in Sec. IV B with α = 0.6. The wrong opinion quickly spreads out through the network in short time (t < 10 2 )-see Fig. 8(b) . However, the leftover nodes with the right opinion keep the right opinion because they have a rare chance to be invaded by the higher authority nodes with the wrong opinion, in the social structure discussed in Sec. IV B. As keeping their opinion, finally, the nodes with the right opinion have an opportunity to deliver their right opinion from a certain time step. Once the right opinion is delivered to the high authority node as shown in Fig. 8(c) , it diffuses through a large degree and strong influential impact, as shown in Figs. 8(d) , (e), and (f). For the network with strong hierarchical tendency with α = 0.6, compared to the α = 0.3 case, the right opinion is rapidly transmitted to the whole network right after it is delivered to high authority nodes.
In general, the low authority nodes are affected by the high authority nodes. However, the social structures [such as the one in Fig. 8 for α = 0.6 (p = 0.1, γ = 3)] include some "isolated" nodes from the main GC with the right opinion. Additionally, the nodes in the specific opinion reservoir group have relatively large chance to be isolated. We check that the probability of being isolated of middle low authoritarians is higher than other authoritarian groups. Only if the isolated nodes keep the right opinion, the right opinion can survive for a long time. Besides, the opinion reservoir nodes can use their original undirected links, connected to both low and high authority nodes, to spread out their right opinion by p. These results again show the importance of confidence level α for heterogeneous authority levels. Moreover, we have found that the comparison process can effectively generate zealous groups, in heterogeneous authority levels, who are willing to lead the system to the consensus. We emphasize that one has to be careful about the interpretation of the result reported in this subsection, as it is likely that the existence of such a specific group is related to our particular choice of initial opinion distribution: the wrong and right opinions are strictly divided by the authority scores. In Figs. 7(a) and (b) , vertically correlated patterns seem to be smeared from the opinion dichotomy in the very beginning indeed.
C. Effect of the initial opinion distribution and system size
Finally, we remark on the effect of the initial opinion distribution in our model, as our "corrupt population" model might be seen as too extreme a case to draw conclusions. However, one can already see that the stability condition discussed in Sec. III is derived regardless of the initial opinion distribution, and we indeed check that randomly distributed initial opinions (each agent's opinion is randomly chosen regardless of the authority scores) do not change our numerical results such as the phase diagram in Fig. 4 . In fact, our original initial condition where the most authoritative agents have the wrong opinion is the harshest condition for opinion spreading from obedient agents, so our conclusion that any nonzero values of p and α yield the eventual takeover (for most cases) of the right opinion of obedient agents would hold in milder conditions, e.g., randomly distributed initial opinions. One particular result that does depend on the initial condition indeed is the existence of the opinion reservoir group discussed in Secs. IV B, as we discover that the randomly distributed initial opinions wipe out such authority-based specific opinion groups.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a stylized opinion formation model to understand the transmission of the low authority agents' opinion by setting an independent individual attributes such as the confidence level, the acceptance probability of right opinion, authority, and structural characteristics, in a population with dichotomous opinions. We have demonstrated how the level of heterogeneity in network structure and authority, and their correlation patterns affect the transmission probability. We have confirmed the crucial role of the confidence level for the transmission even for the case of the scarce sense of the acceptance probability of the right opinion. Even the slightly increased confidence level can cause the dramatic increase of the possibility in prevalence of the opinion from agents with low authority.
In addition, specific authority groups can play a vital role to protect the right opinion and spread it, in the case of the most corrupt population we have examined. Only if the groups, denoted as the opinion reservoir, have the right opinion from the agents with less authority, a population has a large chance for the transmission of the opinion of less authority. The opinion reservoir groups are generated by the comparison process in heterogeneous authority distribution. It gives us a hint for a generation of zealots which have studied intensively for the role of heterogeneous node characteristics [32] [33] [34] . Even though our binary opinion model is highly simplified one, we believe that the conclusion from our study will hold for more general cases. If a population has a will to hear low authority agents' opinion, there is a chance for the opinion to be delivered to entire population. Moreover, if the confidence of each agent is higher than a certain level, the transmission could occurs through the specific opinion reservoir group. The future work may include more realistic network structures such as the networks with communities. As communities are mesoscopic units of our society, we can see how the community structure makes a change for opinion spreading in an authoritarian population. 
